Be forewarned Inoke, you will be prosecuted for your crimes and I have just proven that you are a serial liar.

Read your rubbish opinion published in the Australian and then compare that with hard facts on REAL FIJI NEWS.  

Your LIES have just been EXPOSED. You are a DISGRACE to Fiji and all Fijians, just like Bainimarama.

I have looked into the eyes of those that have committed Treason in Fiji in the past and will surely have the pleasure to stare down at you and Frank.

6 January 2012
Economist Intelligence Unit 
English
(C) 2012 The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.

Asia politics: No democratic progress

FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

After experiencing a wave of change in recent years, the pace of democratisation in Asia and Australasia has slowed. The region's performance in the Economist Intelligence Unit's 2011 Democracy Index is almost unchanged from 2010—although recent reforms in Myanmar, if continued, could improve the overall picture in the year ahead. Following is an overview of the status of democracy in the region, as well as a look at the very different political profiles of Asia's two emerging giants, China and India.

Regional overview

The 2011 Democracy Index captures the wide disparities in democratic development across Asia. The picture is exemplified by the Korean peninsula: South Korea is a full democracy, ranked 22nd globally. By contrast, North Korea props up the listings, coming last of the 167 countries covered by the index. The average score for the region was only slightly lower in 2011 than in 2010. No Asian country underwent a change in regime type in 2011.

Although parts of the region—from North Korea to Laos, Vietnam and China—are still entrenched authoritarian regimes, the past couple of decades have seen the spread of democracy in the region overall. Over the past ten years, some 20 Asian countries have held elections, and many have undergone peaceful transitions in government. Asia is also home to the world's first and third most populous democracies, India and Indonesia.

Yet even in the region's democratic countries, there are often significant problems in the functioning of political systems. Democratic political cultures in Asia are often underdeveloped and shallow, even in the countries that have democratised. In only nine countries in the region do we rate elections as being both free and fair.

Even in parts of the region that are not authoritarian there is often pressure on the independent media. In many countries, Asian Barometer polls show that more citizens believe that recent democratic transitions have brought no improvement to their lives than believe that the changes have been positive. Also, although surveys have found that the majority of Asians say they support democratic ideals, their commitment to limits on a leader's power is far lower than in most other regions.

Key countries

China is ranked 141st out of 167 countries, putting it among the class of governments considered "authoritarian" regimes. This puts it in the company of countries such as Angola, Belarus and Vietnam. China's failure to engage in any form of substantive electoral process involving its people is the main reason for its low overall score of 3.14 (out of 10). The government's mistrust of popular engagement in politics also results in a suppressed political participation score of 3.89, reflecting among other factors the absence of a multiparty system. The civil liberties category also receives a very low score, at 1.18, which highlights the subordination of judicial, trade union and religious bodies to the all-dominating Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The poor score for this category is also the result of China's lack of freedoms in areas such as the Internet, newspapers and broadcast media.

China's low overall democracy index score obscures respectable performances in government functioning and political culture for a country at China's level of development. This in part reflects a compromise whereby the Chinese people have tacitly accepted minimal political freedoms in exchange for competent economic management by the CCP. However, slowing economic growth in 2012 will challenge this bargain, and there are already signs that this will lead to an increase in social unrest.

Meanwhile, corruption and a growing gulf between the political leadership and the mass of the public whom it is meant to represent—the most obvious consequences of the failure to introduce political checks and balances—will continue to be major problems. Against this background, the government is likely to introduce measures to enhance bureaucratic transparency, as well as developing more sophisticated forms of "social management" aimed at maintaining stability and curbing dissent. This, in addition to the efficiency of the security forces, means that the chances of significant political reform, let alone revolution, remain extremely slim.

The CCP will be particularly sensitive to any perceived threat to its power in 2012, since towards the end of the year it will begin to overhaul its key personnel, including those who are currently in senior leadership positions. On a more positive note, underlying social development, including the emergence of civil-society groups and legal and media activism, will still progress, especially at local level, despite the heavy restraints imposed by the CCP leadership.

India ranks 39th out of 167 countries, putting it among the 52 countries considered to be "flawed democracies". This designation includes neighbouring countries such as Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as another emerging-market giant, Brazil. However, India is highly placed within this category, ranking above all of these countries. Its relatively strong position owes much to its high scores in the electoral process and pluralism and civil liberties categories; India's status as the world's largest democracy, and the country's vibrant free press and pluralistic society, have long been justly celebrated. In these areas India outscores even some long-established democracies that we designate "full democracies", including the US and the UK.

However, India fares much worse in the political participation and political culture categories. The phenomenon of the "argumentative Indian" may facilitate public debate, but this does not necessarily translate into a high level of political participation. Voter turnout in the most recent general election, in April-May 2009, stood at 57%, but this figure masks wide variations between different parts of the country, ranging from a turnout figure of 90% in the small north-eastern state of Nagaland to just 46% in Uttar Pradesh, India's largest and most politically influential state.

The political culture category incorporates less tangible indicators of the foundations for democracy, including the population's perceptions of, and desire for, rule by the military or by technocrats rather than by an elected government. India's relatively poor score in this category probably reflects the impatience of at least some segments of society with the country's cumbersome, slow-moving system of government and their desire for a potentially more efficient form of leadership. This is particularly noteworthy given that comparisons continue to be made between the economic growth rates and prospects of India and China: debate still flourishes about whether the ability of China so far to achieve faster rates of economic growth than India owes at least something to the fact that it is non-democratic and therefore perhaps more efficient.

India's score for government functioning is fairly high but has fallen to 7.50 in the 2011 index, from 8.57 in the 2010 index. The score is constrained by lingering issues relating to government accountability and especially corruption; a number of high-profile, high-value corruption scandals have been brought to light since October 2010, highlighting the pervasiveness of corruption throughout the political system. The country's continuing reliance on governments consisting of unwieldy and often uncooperative coalitions often serves to hinder crucial economic reforms. Despite high hopes, no major structural economic reform has been pushed through since the government began its second term in May 2009, and in 2011 parliamentary proceedings have been brought to a halt on several occasions as opposition parties—and at times even members of the ruling coalition—protested against proposed legislation. Such obstructionism, as well as the general perception that the government is weak and ineffective, has led to policy paralysis in recent months.

Democracy Index 2011
Country          2011 rank 2011 score 2010 rank 2010 score 2011 regime type
New Zealand      5         9.26       5         9.26       Full democracy
Australia        6         9.22       6         9.22       Full democracy
Japan            21        8.08       22        8.08       Full democracy
South Korea      22        8.06       20        8.11       Full democracy

Taiwan           37        7.46       36        7.52       Flawed democracy
India            39        7.30       40        7.28       Flawed democracy
Timor-Leste      42        7.22       42        7.22       Flawed democracy
Sri Lanka        57        6.58       55        6.64       Flawed democracy
Thailand         58        6.55       58        6.55       Flawed democracy
Indonesia        60        6.53       60        6.53       Flawed democracy
Papua New Guinea 67        6.32       59        6.54       Flawed democracy
Mongolia         69        6.23       64        6.36       Flawed democracy
Malaysia         71        6.19       71        6.19       Flawed democracy
Philippines      75        6.12       74        6.12       Flawed democracy

Hong Kong        80        5.92       80        5.92       Hybrid regime
Singapore        81        5.89       82        5.89       Hybrid regime
Bangladesh       83        5.86       83        5.87       Hybrid regime
Cambodia         101       4.87       100       4.87       Hybrid regime
Bhutan           104       4.57       102       4.68       Hybrid regime
Pakistan         105       4.55       104       4.55       Hybrid regime
Nepal            108       4.24       108       4.24       Hybrid regime

Fiji             123       3.67       119       3.62       Authoritarian
China            141       3.14       136       3.14       Authoritarian
Vietnam          143       2.96       140       2.94       Authoritarian
Afghanistan      152       2.48       150       2.48       Authoritarian
Laos             156       2.10       156       2.10       Authoritarian
Myanmar          =161      1.77       163       1.77       Authoritarian
North Korea      167       1.08       167       1.08       Authoritarian

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 

Moody's Disclosures on Credit Ratings of Fiji, Government of

18 January 2012
Moody's Investors Service Press Release
English
(c) 2012

The following release represents Moody's Investors Service's summary credit opinion on Fiji, Government of and includes certain regulatory disclosures regarding its ratings. This release does not constitute any change in Moody's ratings or rating rationale for Fiji.

Moody's current ratings on Fiji, Government of are:

Long Term Issuer (domestic and foreign currency) ratings of B1

Senior Unsecured (domestic and foreign currency) ratings of B1

RATINGS RATIONALE

Fiji's B1 government bond ratings reflect a low level of economic resiliency, low government financial strength, and a high susceptibility to event risk. Some of Fiji's statistical indicators--notably external debt ratios--compare favorably with countries in the same rating range. However, the ratings are constrained by these other factors. Low economic resiliency is indicated by very low GDP per capita and the small size of the economy. Low institutional strength reflects weak scores in the World Bank's indices of governance and rule of law. The Reserve Bank's independence has recently been compromised.

The government's financial strength is assessed as low because of the high ratios of government debt and interest payments to government revenue. These are partially mitigated by two factors: (1) most government debt is held by the FijiNational Provident Fund, which will continue to invest in government securities over the medium term; (2) the proportion of debt denominated in foreign currency is relatively small, meaning that the government is not subject to exchange-rate risk or to adverse conditions in global financial markets.

Fiji is subject to political event risk. After the overthrow of the government in 2000, government finances deteriorated as did the level of investment in the economy. Real GDP growth and investment activity has similarly declined and subsequently stagnated following the December 2006 coup.

The negative outlook was maintained following the downgrade of the sovereign rating to B1 in April 2009 due to expectations of a continued deterioration in the balance of payments. Following a large devaluation of the Fijian dollar and the imposition of strict exchange controls, foreign exchange reserves rebounded as tourist arrivals and export shipments recovered. However, growth remains lackluster and has had an adverse effect on the trajectory of government debt, justifying the maintenance of the negative outlook.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Sovereign Bond Ratings published in September 2008. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

REGULATORY DISCLOSURES

Although this credit rating has been issued in a non-EU country which has not been recognized as endorsable at this date, this credit rating is deemed "EU qualified by extension" and may still be used by financial institutions for regulatory purposes until 30 April 2012. Further information on the EU endorsement status and on the Moody's office that has issued a particular Credit Rating is available on www.moodys.com.

For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt, this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation to the rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.

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Please see Moody's Rating Symbols and Definitions on the Rating Process page on www.moodys.com for further information on the meaning of each rating category and the definition of default and recovery.

Please see ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for the last rating action and the rating history. The date on which some ratings were first released goes back to a time before Moody's ratings were fully digitized and accurate data may not be available. Consequently, Moody's provides a date that it believes is the most reliable and accurate based on the information that is available to it. Please see the ratings disclosure page on our website www.moodys.com for further information.

Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued the rating.

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